In two-sided matching markets, the concept of stability proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) is one of the most important solution concepts. In this paper, we consider a problem related to the stability of a matching in a two-sided matching market with indifferences (i.e., ties). The introduction of ties into preference lists dramatically changes the properties of stable matchings. For example, stable matchings need not have the same size. Furthermore, it is known that stability do not guarantee Pareto efficiency that is also one of the most important solution concepts in two-sided matching markets. This fact naturally leads to the concept of Pareto stability, i.e., both stable and Pareto efficient. Ergin (2006, 2008) proved that there always exists a Pareto stable matching in a one-to-one/many-to-one matching market with indifferences and gave a polynomial-time algorithm for finding it. Furthermore, Chen (2012) proved that there always exists a Pareto stable matching in a many-to-many matching market with indifferences and gave a polynomial-time algorithm for finding it. In this paper, we propose a new approach to the problem of finding a Pareto stable matching in a many-to-many matching market with indifferences. Our algorithm is an alternative proof of the existence of a Pareto stable matching in a many-to-many matching market with indifferences.
Introduction
Since the seminal work of Gale and Shapley [7] , two-sided matching markets have been extensively studied in both Economics and Computer Science [8, 21, 15] . In this model, there exist two groups of agents and each agent has a preference ranking over members of the other group. The goal is to find a matching between these two groups with some specified properties. In two-sided matching markets, the concept of stability proposed by Gale and Shapley [7] is one of the most important solution concepts.
In this paper, we consider a problem related to the stability of a matching in a two-sided matching market with indifferences (i.e., ties). The introduction of ties into preference lists dramatically changes the properties of stable matchings [12] . For example, stable matchings need not have the same size. The problem of finding a maximum-size stable matching is N Phard [11, 16] , and several approximation algorithms have been proposed [13, 17] . Moreover, it is known that stability do not guarantee Pareto efficiency, where Pareto efficiency means that there exists no other matching improving some agent without hurting everyone else (for its definition, see Section 2) . Since the concept of Pareto efficiency is also one of the most important solution concepts in two-sided matching markets, this fact has received much attention in Economics [1, 2, 5, 6, 23] and naturally leads to the concept of Pareto stability [23] , i.e., both stable and Pareto efficient. Erdil and Ergin [5, 6] proved that there always exists a Pareto stable matching in a one-to-one/many-to-one matching market with indifferences and gave a polynomial-time algorithm for finding it. Furthermore, Chen [3] proved that there always exists a Pareto stable matching in a many-to-many matching market with indifferences and gave a polynomial-time algorithm for finding it.
In this paper, we propose a new approach to the problem of finding a Pareto stable matching in a many-to-many matching market with indifferences. Compared with the algorithms proposed in [5, 6, 3] , our algorithm is not based on the characterization of a Pareto stable matching using a Pareto improvement cycle/chain (see Section 2) . In our algorithm, we iteratively compute a rank-maximal matching [10, 14, 18, 9] that is another solution concept in matching markets. Our algorithm is an alternative proof of the existence of a Pareto stable matching in a many-to-many matching market with indifferences.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally define our problem and review previous results. In Section 3, we propose our algorithm. The next three sections are preliminaries to the proof of the correctness of our algorithm. In Section 4, we consider a relationship between Pareto efficiency and rank-maximality. In Section 5, we give a reduction from the rank-maximal matching problem to the maximum-cost matching problem. In Section 6, we introduce an auxiliary directed graph. In Section 7, we prove the correctness of our algorithm.
Problem formulation
Let N (resp., Z + ) be the set of positive integers (reps., non-negative integers).
Throughout this paper, we are given a finite simple undirected bipartite graph G with a vertex set V and an edge set E. Define n := |V | and m := |E|. Assume that a vertex set V is partitioned into two disjoint subsets P and Q such that every edge of E connects a vertex of P and one of Q. For each edge e that connects a vertex v of P and a vertex w of Q, we write e(v, w). For each vertex v of V and each subset F of E, we denote by F (v) the set of edges of E that are incident to v. Furthermore, we are given a capacity function c : V → N, and we are given a preference ranking function
, then a vertex v strictly prefers an edge e to an edge f . If π v (e) = π v (f ), then v is indifferent between e and f . We call a bipartite graph G with a capacity function c and preference ranking functions π v (v ∈ V ) a many-to-many matching market with indifferences.
A subset A of E is said to be feasible with respect to a vertex 
An edge e of E \ A is called a blocking edge with respect to A, if both endpoints of e are free with respect to A. An assignment A is said to be stable, if there exists no blocking edge with respect to A. Now we define the concept of Pareto efficiency. For this, we have to define the preference of a vertex v of V over subsets of E(v). Let F be a subset of E(v) consisting of p edges e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e p such that 
Known results
Here we review the known algorithms for finding a Pareto stable matching. We first review the algorithms proposed by Erdil and Ergin [5, 6] . Their algorithms are based on the characterization of a Pareto stable matching using a Pareto improvement cycle/chain (for the formal definitions, see [5, 6, 3] ). Roughly speaking, we can improve some agent without hurting everyone else along a Pareto improvement cycle/chain. It is known [5, 6, 3] that an assignment A is Pareto efficient if and only if there exists no Pareto improvement cycle/chain with respect to A. Furthermore, it is known [5, 6] that in a one-to-one/many-to-one matching markets (i.e., c(v) = 1 for every vertex v of V , or c(v) = 1 for every vertex v of P ), the stability is preserved even if we improve an assignment along a Pareto improvement cycle/chain. So, we can obtain the following algorithm. Starting from any stable assignment, keep improving an assignment by eliminating Pareto improvement cycles/chains until none remain. However, it is also known [3] that this algorithm does not work in a many-to-many matching market. This is because improving an assignment along a Pareto improvement cycle/chain need not preserve the stability in a many-to-many matching market (see Example 1 in [3] ). For overcoming this difficulty, Chen [3] proposed an algorithm based on an alternative to Gale-Shapley algorithm presented by Roth and Vande Vate [20] . In this algorithm, men "arrive" one by one, and a Pareto improvement chain is carefully eliminated. Although the author does not explicitly evaluate the time complexity of this algorithm, if we naively evaluate its time complexity, then it becomes O(n 6 m 2 ∆), where ∆ denotes the time required to checking and finding a Pareto improvement cycle. We should remark that Chen and Ghosh [4] also considered Pareto stable solutions in many-to-many matching markets. However, in the paper [4] , every pair of agents can transact any number of units, which is very different from the present paper in which at most one unit can be assigned. 
Algorithm
For each vertex v of V , let π v,1 > π v,2 > · · · be the distinct values of π v (e) (e ∈ E(v)).
Rank-maximal matchings
For each subsets A, B of E, we write A B, if one of the following conditions is satisfied. 
If (R2) or (R3) holds, then we write A B.
Assume that we are a function α :
for every vertex v of P and every positive integer i, and
Assume that we are given a subset F of E. An α-eligible subset A of F is called a rank-maximal α-matching on F , if A B for every α-eligible subset B of F .
Description of the algorithm
For each vertex v of P and each subset F of E, define
for each vertex v of P and each positive integer i. Assume that A, F are subsets of E with A ⊆ F . For each vertex v of P and each positive integer i, define
We are now ready to propose our algorithm, called ParetoStable.
Step1: Set R 0 := ∅ and t := 0
Step2: Repeat the following (2-a) to (2-c) until the algorithm halts.
(2-a) Update t := t + 1, and set
Since R 0 R 1 · · · holds, this algorithm halts in finite time. In the sequel, the algorithm halts when t = T . Notice that T is at most m.
Pareto efficiency and rank-maximality
In this section, we consider a relationship between Pareto efficiency and rank-maximality. For each subset F of E and each positive integer i, define
Lemma 1. If an assignment A dominates an assignment B, then
for every vertex v of Q and every positive integer i.
Furthermore,
for some vertex w of P and some positive integer s, and/or
for some vertex w of Q and some positive integer s.
Proof. We first prove that (D1) holds. Assume that v is a vertex of P and i is a positive integer. Moreover, assume that A(v) consists of p edges e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e p such that
Let j be the maximum positive integer such that j ≤ q and
Similarly, we can prove that (D2) holds. Next we prove that (E1) and/or (E2) holds. Since A dominates B, there exists a vertex w of V such that A(w) > w B(w). Now we prove that if w ∈ P , then (E1) holds. Assume that A(w) consists of p edges e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e p such that π w (e 1 ) ≥ π w (e 2 ) ≥ · · · ≥ π w (e p ) and B(w) consists of of q edges
We first consider the case of p > q. Let s be a positive integer such that π w,s = π w (e q+1 ). Then,
Next we consider the case where there exists a positive integer j such that j ≤ q and π w (e j ) > π w (f j ). Let s be the positive integer with π w,s = π w (e j ). Since π w (f j ) < π w (e j ) = π w,s , we have
Similarly, we can prove that if w ∈ Q, then (E2) holds.
Lemma 2. If an assignment A dominates an assignment B, then A B.
Proof. We first assume that (E2) of Lemma 1 holds. Let s be the minimum positive integer i such that there exists a vertex w of Q with Γ i (A(w)) > Γ i (B(w)). For every vertex v of Q and every positive integer i with i < s, Γ i (A(v)) = Γ i (B(v)) follows from (D2). By this and (D2),
This implies that γ s (A) > γ s (B) and γ i (A) = γ i (B) for every positive integer i with i < s, which implies that (R2) holds.
Next we consider the case where (E2) does not hold, but (E1) holds. In this case, by (D2), 
Maximum-cost matchings
In this section, we consider the reduction from finding a rank-maximal matching to finding a maximum-cost matching defined as follows. This reduction is a standard technique in the study of rank-maximal matchings [10, 14, 18, 9] .
For each vertex v of V , let φ(v) be the number of the distinct values of π v (e) (e ∈ E(v)).
For each subset F of E, define
Assume that we are given a subset F of E and a function α : Assume that (R2) holds. In this case, the size of B is clearly at most m − 1. So, since A = ∅ and 1 ≤ k P (e) ≤ m φ P −1 for every edge e of E, 
By this and φ
Assume that (R3) holds. In this case, k Q (A) = k Q (B). Let s be a positive integer such that λ s (A) > λ s (B) and λ i (A) = λ i (B) for every positive integer i with i < s. Let B be the set of edges e(v, w) of B such that r v (e) ≤ s. It is not difficult to see that 
Auxiliary Directed Graph
For each vertex v of P and each positive integer i with i ≤ φ(v), let v(i) be a new vertex. Define
For each edge e(v, w), define v(e) := v(r v (e)). For each edge e(v, w)
of E, let e + be an arc from v(e) to w, and let e − be an arc from w to v(e). For each subset F of E, define F + := {e + | e ∈ F } and F − := {e − | e ∈ F }. For each vertex u of U P (resp., Q) and each subset L of E + , let L(u) be the set of arcs of L leaving (resp., entering) u. For each edge e of E, define l(e + ) := k(e) and l(e − ) :
Assume that we are given a function α : P × N → Z + . A subset K of E + is said to be α-good, if |K(v(i))| ≤ α(v, i) for every vertex v(i) of U P and |K(v)| ≤ c(v) for every vertex
For each subsets A, F of E with A ⊆ F and each function α : P × N → Z + , it is easy to see that A is a maximum-cost α-matching on F if and only if A + is a maximum-length α-matching on F + . So, it follows from Lemma 3 that A is a rank-maximal α-matching on F if and only if A + is a maximum-length α-matching on F + .
Let A, F be subsets of E with A ⊆ F . Define F + /A := (F + \ A + ) ∪ A − . Let D(F )/A be a directed graph with a vertex set U and an arc set F + /A. Assume that S is a directed path from a vertex u of U to a vertex w of U on D(F )/A. (In this paper, a directed path may pass through the same vertex more than once, but we do not allow that a directed path passes through the same arc more than once. Furthermore, a single vertex is regarded as a directed path with no arc.) Define the length l(S) of a directed path S by the sum of the lengths of arcs contained in S. A directed path S is called a circuit, if u = w and S contains at least one arc. Assume that S is not a circuit. We call S a semi-augmenting path, if (i) w ∈ U P , or (ii) w ∈ Q and |A + (w)| < c(w). We call a semi-augmenting path S an α-augmenting path, 
Lemma 4. For each vertex v of Q and each positive integer t with 2 ≤ t ≤ T , d t (v) ≤ d t−1 (v).

Proof. Assume that v is a vertex of Q and t is positive integer with 2 ≤ t ≤ T . Since
It is known [22, the proof of Theorem 12.1] that (1) can be decomposed into a collection L of arc-disjoint circuits and ω Ft -augmenting paths on D such that (i) l(L) ≥ 0 for every member L of L, and (ii) for each vertex u of U P , there exist ω Ft -augmenting paths from u, or there exist ω Ft -augmenting paths to u, or there exists no ω Ft -augmenting path from/to u (i.e., exactly one of these three cases holds).
Without loss of generality, we can assume that S passes through each vertex at most once. Let S a be the set of arcs of S contained in D . Notice that an arc of S a is not contained in a member of L. Let S b be the set of arcs a of S with a / ∈ S a , i.e., the arc obtained by reversing the orientation of a is contained in D . Let S p be the set of arcs of D obtained by reversing the orientation of arcs of S b . Notice that every arc of S p are passed through by exactly one member of L.
We prove that there exists a directed path K from v on D satisfying the following.
(P1) K is a directed path to v or a vertex u of U such that there exists an ω Ft -augmenting path of L to u. (P2) Let v co be the vertex of S that K passes through last. Let K (resp., S ) is a subpath of K (resp., K) from v to v co . Then, we have l(K ) ≥ l(S ).
Assume that there exists a directed path K from v on D satisfying (P1) and (P2). If K is a directed path to v , then v co = v , i.e., K = K and S = S.
Assume that K is a directed path to a vertex u such that there exists an ω Ft -augmenting path of L to u. In this case, K is a semi-augmenting path from v on D . Let K and S be subpaths of K and S obtained by removing K and S , respectively. Then, What remains is to prove that there exists a directed path K on D satisfying (P1) and (P2). Such a path can be constructed by the following operation. Starting from a vertex v on D , we go along arcs of S a until we meet the head of an arc of S p (see Figure 1(a) ). Recall that there exists a unique member L of L that passes through this arc (see Figure 1(b) ). So, we go along L until we meet the tail of an arc a of L with a ∈ S p (see Figure 1(c) ). Then, we again go along arcs of S a until we meet the head of an arc of S p (see Figure 1(d) ). During this operation, if we meet v or a vertex u of U such that there exists an ω Ft -augmenting path of L to u, this operation halts. By repeating this operation (see Figure 1(e)-(f) ), our path eventually meet v or a vertex u of U such that there exists an ω Ft -augmenting path of L to u. Notice that it is not difficult to see that this operation halts in finite time. (We can prove this by contradiction. Assuming thatŜ is the first subpath of S that our path passes through more than once. However, since members of L are arc-disjoint, there must exist another subpath of S that our path passes through more than once before passing throughŜ twice.)
Let K be the directed path obtained by the above operation. Now we prove that (P2) holds. Assume that the form of K is (S 0 , K 1 , S 1 , . . . , K h , S h ), where S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S h are subpaths of S such that arcs of S i are contained in S a for every non-negative integer i with i ≤ h and 
Assume that S passes through q i before p i (see Figure 1(e) ). Let S r sub be a subpath of S from
Since S ≤i (resp., S • i ) is a directed path obtained by combining K ≤i (resp.,
. This completes the proof.
Lemma 5. If e(v, w) is an edge of R
Proof. Let e(v, w) be an edge of R T −1 . Assume that r v (e) = i and e ∈ κ(A t ; F t ) for a positive integer t with t < T . This implies that 
Correctness
We are now ready to prove the correctness of the algorithm ParetoStable. For simplicity. define
Next we prove that A is stable. For this, we need the following lemma. Assume that the form of C is (e Proof. The theorem immediately follows form Lemmas 7 and 9.
Time complexity
Here we consider the time complexity of the algorithm ParetoStable. Since the number of iterations of Step 2 is at most m. So, the algorithm ParetoStable can find a Pareto stable assignment in O(m · MC) time, where MC represents the time required to find a rank-maximal ω F -matching on F , i.e., a maximum-length ω F -matching on F + for one subset F of E. Notice that due to the definition of ω F , when we find a maximum-length ω F -matching on F + , we need only two vertices instead of vertices v (1), v(2), . . . , v(φ(v) ). We can contract vertices v(1), . . . , v(∂ F (v) − 1) into one vertex, and we can delete vertices v (∂ F (v) + 1), . . . , v(φ(v) ). So, if we use the algorithm proposed in [19] , then MC becomes O(m 3 log n + m 2 n log 2 n), where we assume that arithmetic on numbers O(m 2m ) takes O(m) time. Thus, the time complexity of the algorithm ParetoStable becomes O(m 4 log n + m 3 n log 2 n) time.
